Just look for the right people, the ones with soul and rational thinking! Oh come on, Garance! Plus, who wants to be with a guy or be friends with a girl that needs you to fulfill all of these requirements just to have a relationship with them? There is just so much wrong with this post! It reduces every human interaction whether it be for love or friendship to what we have — i.
I say this as someone who loves looking beautiful, having nice things, but at the same time I just cannot comprehend this crowd! What about being funny? I would never want a man who judges me purely on a tick list of material items. I liked this post until I got to the paragraph saying that women have to be skinny and muscular in order to be considered perfect. Sad perception of perfect. I spent a year in the States no, not in NYC, but it was equally weird experience as regards romance and could not understand a single thing about dating rules. OMG, how can people complicate the simplest things like romance?
So thankful to live in Europe: Bravo pr ce post hillarant!!!! Superbe edito Garance, merci. Reste cool Garance tu es par-faite! Hum moi je suis francaise et mariee a un vrai new yokais, genre ne a Brooklyn, depuis 10 ans. On a fait plein de changements dans sa vie et maintenant il est super heureux! I also believe that everyone has their story, no one is perfect, thatS an illusion!!!
Alors vis ta vie Garance!!! Je suis bien decue que le Bhutan abandonne sa poursuite du bonheur comme objectif! I love this city, love love love it. But dating here ughhh not so much. Everyone has their own agenda. As if success was measured buy the level of perfectness, when it comes to fulfilling every. Well, I lived there a couple years so, been there done that. I am not french but I have always felt instinctual when it comes to men and potential relationships and if it feels right, you click and enjoy each others company then you really have something that is at least worth exploring.
That said, my boyfriend was patiently persistent with me over a course of a year. It wasnt instinctual for me but once I opened by heart to the opportunity I could suddenly see him in a whole new light that allowed for something amazing to grow! Thankyou for a beautifully written article. Great writing, dear Garance! My life has nothing in common with yours in NYC. But, I can relate, really! I realize that visiting and living there are two different things, but despite everything bizarre you mentioned in your post, I can tell how much you are intrigued by the City.
The dating part you described is happening right now everywhere in America, if you live in a somewhat bigger city. But this country is very diverse and despite all the classifications and generalizations , you notice those , who stay true to themselves: And you are one of them, Stay cool and not perfect and enjoy your NYC, the way you see it and love it. Il y a un dosage parfait entre photos de mode et de lifestyle, articles de racontage de vie avec humour, descriptifs de tendances etc.
I love this post. And I think this is why I should have been French. Ahh how I wish dating were as simple in Canada as in France! And now you have to guess who belongs in which category and act appropriately! I believe in you, Garance. All you can do is be authentic, be yourself, and I know everything will fall in line. O M G this post gives me so much anxiety!!! I loved this post — especially the boxed non-box section at the bottom.
Actually, I still kind of am. It seems like North-Americans like to play this weird game where they refuse to commit and give things truly a go, and instead just keep their options wiiide open. Either you want to commit, or not! I have been a silent reader of yours for yeeears but this is by far my favorite article you ever wrote!!! New York is a great place but it is not without its flaws…. The measure of a successful life has to be more than bagging a rich husband, living in the right apartment and having a small, muscular body………..
Garance, your blog is very insightful and does capture the nonsense that goes on……but it is also a cautionary tale…. Chere Garance, merci beaucoup de tes jolis mots. La vie est belle et il faut en profiter!!! Along with a lot of good times, — came mistakes, ups and downs, divorce, and more mistakes! Hang in there all you young women and men who are worried to death about having the right apartment, the right lover, the best job, the coolest friends, the most money, etc.. My mother always said: I agree, I love and appreciate that Garance is so totally real here, but the whole situation makes me feel a little sad for all those people.
Ca explique beaucoup de choses, en fait. During my first few years in the states when I was in my early 20s I unintentionally gained myself an unfavorable reputation, simply because I had several short-term relationships for which I wholeheartedly committed to and enjoyed and by every single one of which I was utterly heart broken. Although I did not understand nor make concord with this twisted perception by others of me, I had felt extremely wary of the criticism. When I expressed that I am in no hurry, they started to suspect that there is problem in my relationship.
As you said, it is NOT a job! And, life — life is also not a job. In a modern society of a modern civilization — no matter how Utopian-isque it sounds like — a failed relationship or a failed marriage is NOT the end of the world! The question comes down to: Is there one, especially concerning such personal subject as romantic relationship? You have told us about the beginning of a relationship in France, but I am curious to know how a relationship ends? Do relationships in France end as simply and casually, from an American perspective, as they started?
In the US beginnings may be complicated, but endings always seem to be messy and filled with drama. Garance, here in Brazil the dating thing goes equal as the US one. Also, the brazilian women are getting more and more obsessed for the perfection: And I think the same as you, like all the people around me are getting a little obsessed with all this coolness and perfectionism. Garance, welcome to Noo Yawk! I love the city as much as you do, but there are enough pressures here like paying the rent! Thanks for a much-needed laugh today.
Garance, you nailed this French vs. Aside from the transatlantic differences in dating, though, this is one of my favorite posts you have ever written! I love your style, humor, honesty. I lived in NYC for few years. But in my opinion, if you feel you must be perfect, then do this:. Be yourself follow no one Make mistakes and learn from them Eat the damn food! And so did you dear G. I think the best thing about your posts is this: I for one am happy I got off and hopped over the big blue ocean for a more peaceful and somehow even more perfect life.
Reste comme tu es: Il manque la maison et les vacances dans les Hamptons! Just when I thought maybe her blog has become to mainstream, too much stuff is promoted,too many boring fashion posts…. You hit the nail on the head: Nobody can just let loose. NYC is the worst. But it is everywhere in the US.
Really, so spot on. Thanks for the post. I will be reading on!! Keep those posts coming, that you write like totally from a gut feeling. I have a couple of friends who gave up and had kids alone, thanks to artificial insemination. They were tired of the rat race, being extremely intelligent, successful women who were pretty but not drop-dead gorgeous enough to make any guy stay.
I have a lot of NY friends who are single, sometimes by choice, sometimes less so. They find themselves, in their 40s, being compared physically with women much younger. The guys seem fine. Pushing 50 or well past it, my exes and a bunch of other guys I know from work are all still single and still dating somethings. You want a nice guy?
You want a good time in the sack with no tomorrow? Go out in NY. I used to live in NY and while I agree with many of the points you make party why I left! You just want an equally impossible to maintain! French women work very hard to make things look easy. This is not to discredit French women, but to acknowledge that women in many cultures are putting in overtime! I just think it is the goal that is different. In France, it is to appear very natural whereas in the US it is to look polished. Awesome post as always, Garance! Missed your writing for some time but happy to see you are wise as ever!
Are You an Author?
LA is similar — but that everyone is an actress in process. The men are always looking over their shoulder for someone better that may be walking in the room. This is so true. Why do women grovel? I was so disappointed in the Anaconda video. Here she is celebrating her body type, and then it cuts to her crawling on all fours toward a fully clothed guy who sits there, with his arms crossed, like a judge. HE should be the one crawling to beg to worship before the goddess that is Nicki Minaj! It makes me think of what Lena Dunham said in an interview about guys getting their sex education from porn, and wanting to do a bunch of weird stuff that has nothing to do with feeling good but a lot about power.
The pressure for perfection is all part of it. Women are supposed to be perfect. Men can be themselves. To counter this, women need to be more demanding of men and easier on themselves. Anyhow, this is such a great post. Another reason not that I need another to love you as I do. Les hommes consomment et se lassent vite…. As a very new mum I walk around my neighborhood noho and sometimes feel inadequate in the presence of soooo many perfect New York girls. But then I realize that I like wearing sneakers and no makeup and eating croissants and having my little business.
I did win at the marriage, baby, sweet apt and country house part of life I guess so I really cannot complain as I do not have to use tinder or pay rent. Anyway, Please let me know when you would like to go eat pastries at the Smile in sweatpants on a girl date. After skipping soul cycle and blowing off work for the morning! I will be carrying my baby in a Celine bag to prove I am cool ;. Et la spontaneite dans tout cela? I love this post! It reminded me both of what amused me and daunted me about dating in the city when I lived there a while ago. I was a shrinking but still heavy woman in that city.
I felt like no size would ever be small enough. The irony is that I did meet men who were interested in me there but I was too self-conscious to let it go anywhere. When I went back to visit the city after leaving, I had two men ask for my number in a weekend. Anyway, thanks for the post! The men in NYC are spoiled brats and do not care about anything but appearances.
So glad that I do not live there any more! Interesting post so everything I ever thought about New York is true sounds scary and fascinating at the same time. And even in the most sarcastic of ways it sounds accurate! Good luck new york ladies! I think perhaps the reason the screening process of dating in America is so intense because heartbreak is what they would all like to avoid.
Because…hey, everything was laid out on the table! You knew what you were getting into! I think the downfall of American society and subcultures is that they are strangely difficult and unadaptable when it comes to change. You might as well be a stranger. They forget that there is continuous growing to be done in life, and it must be done together with acceptance and support. That, I believe, is the hard part. How is heartbreak viewed in France?
Maybe almost befriend it? Or pretend it never happened? Thank you for the laughes and inspiration really great post. Perfection is no fun. I love personal stories like this, you are so good at writing, I love your style which is funny and relatable. I think that what you are best at is your writing, as well as your photos and illustrations — and it is not so much the fashion aspect which interests me, but your love for beauty and your ability to create an atmosphere — when you do that, with your writing, your photos or your illustrations you make me feel very happy.
Thank you for that. Lots of love from Germany, Hamburg. I do so love when you do posts like this. They are always make me laugh and ring so true. I also really really love the illustration at the beginning. I hope you will make it available as a print in your shop. Keep up the good work and never stop being you! Very accurately captures the madness that is dating in NYC. Even when they have amazingly accomplished women by their side. And arrival of Tinder and other similar apps is only making it worse, shortening attention spans and breeding bad behaviors and lack of communication.
I think you are right, there is enough material in this to write a whole book! Columbus, Ohio is great! All you New Yorkers are welcome to move here, leaving the perfect life baggage behind! The rents are much more reasonable. I laughed out loud reading this post!!! I am living in Buenos Aires for more than now and feel so much happier just being who I really am and living as I please, which is what I think life should be like. I like very much a quote by Caroline de Margreit, she said: Get real, relax and enjoy life as it is!!!
This was a funny post…… As a native New Yorker i have to say some of it is true… but only for a small portion of people… the truth is , you are pretty perfect; Maybe with some imperfections, just like NYC! Well written and true. Perfection is an impossibly elusive set of ever-evolving rules requiring endless tasks and superhuman feats that only serve to distract us from really enjoying our lives and figuring out who we really are. I simply love this post. Merci pour cet amusant article. Garance, thank you for this post! The honesty and insight has reminded me of all of the reasons I love your blog.
Also, frequent weekend trips are great to get away from the insanity, but by the end of the weekend you miss the city and are ready to throw yourself back into the routine. Oh my Garance, this post made me laugh hard!!!!! I love your sense of humor and reading your point of view, I think you are totally right! Donc on voit un peu de tout. And it explains why I felt a bit weirded out by all the neurosis I saw in New Yorkers when I visited! Wow you hit the nail on the head… I took my own path, a very unconventional one, and the result was that now I get to be with the love of my life.
To hell with these crazy rules…fall in love your own way! Juste la pollution en plus et les pres en moins. New York dating is pretty much how dating is also in Manila. I absolutely loved reading this post! Beaucoup dont je suis … un peu! Et comme toutes ici je te dis: Avoir 10 kg de trop selon mon auto-norme parisienne, ce qui doit vouloir dire 20 de trop selon la norme NYaise ET avoir encore des hommes qui tombent amoureux de vous… VIVA le romantisme!
After all, I think living in a small town in Europe is not that bad. Garance, such a great post. Sometimes I just wonder how you can deal with the pressure! This is a great post, Garance. To deconstruct and analyze every single aspect of life is reneging instinct. And love, thanks god, is pure unreason. So I find this to be spot on…but especially true of the little bubble of Manhattan Life. And my end to the dating story? I found a great French guy and moved to Provence! Much, much less game playing involved and thirteen years later…well, I may not be as thin as I used to be frooomaaage!
Comme dirait Asterix — Ils sont fous ces ricains…. Bienvenue dans la Matrice.. A seldom item for a fashionblog, but the discussion is interesting thanks to your candor, Garance. My point of view: Maybe the NYs are dating straighter like there is no time to lose and handle love from the very beginning as a part of what I call life-business: Romantic love happens in the college-years that is what Garance called innocent and also in between, but ends not often in marriage.
Marriage is a social item all over the world in times past and now. Overall in former times and todays conservative circles family clans play the rule of a jury. In modern societies our cliques take this part. I call NYs dating not cynical but naive. You can take after long, long search the perfect partner ever — it is not a guaranty for livelong happyness: It is not so different in NY westside from elsewhere. Bien que ton post soit cynico-sarcastique comme on aime tous , il fait mal. Merci trop pour le futur Pardon My French!!! Article excellentissime, es-tu en train de devenir Carrie?
Moi qui trouvais que nos hommes ont vraiment le melon ces temps -ci. On se vend sur des sites, on se fait la guerre entre filles: Thank you so much Garance! Enfin, merci pour cet article, ce souffle salavateur! Tu dis tout haut ce que beaucoup penses tout bas! Tu sais croquer les choses! My marriage should have been great — all of the conditions were met. Alas, after 12 years it ended. I met my current man at work as a friend, but one day it clicked for us. I highly recommended the French way! Keep up the good work Garance. Your readers appreciate your astute observations and honesty!
So much of we read in lifestyle magazines is falsely presented as perfect, making our own lives feel inadequate. I love your drawings, your recommendations, and mostly your perspective. In the end we all die and turn into dust so why not be original? One of my favorite things, comparing French and American culture.
I never tire of it but fear becoming a bore about it to others. You have to take the good with the bad in both cultures. I am always so amazed how easily the French and Europeans in general accept no for an answer. I get riled up at any irrationality and want to get to the bottom of it. There are so many rules and limits in France, I get tired of feeling all tied up after a while there.
If she were in the US she would be earning more and working at a higher level. So many rules in France. Rules even for how you give birth. It seems all women give birth the same way in France — epidural, maybe breastfeed but for six months maximum. Here in the US, you can give birth however you want and breastfeed as long as you want. I know women who did home births, women who scheduled c-sections. But back to my point, rules are why the French eat better and are slimmer — you eat three meals at a table, never ever ever do you not eat at the table, ca ne se fait pas!! Except for aperitif I have such a hard time remembering that French rule about always and only eating at the table.
Sometimes I just want to curl up with a bowl of ice cream in front of the TV. My wonderful French husband managed to accept that part of American culture and I love him for it, and for many other things of course. If I absolutely had to choose between the two cultures I would choose American because I can sort of live like a French woman in the US. But I could live in either country if I can just always remember to appreciate the good and accept that the bad has to go along with the good.
Ah, sorry so long! Hi Carla, Your point of view is so so interesting. Thanks, I would like to read more about how you see difference between us and france. I like to understand how other people think and like that we can find out our strength and weakness. Obviously french are also ambitious but discretion is a rule in Europe. Being rich, powerful and show it to others is considered as a vulgar behaviour.
Thanks for responding to my comment Tu and Florence, so interesting! Certainly Americans have less discretion, or perhaps rather we have fewer social limitations and open up and share more readily. I admire the French and Europeans for their subtlety, humility, respect for others. Perhaps related to the socialist culture and simply to the fact that there are more people per square kilometer over there!
Ok, so explain Manhattan, ha. The way the French speak quietly in public is something I always notice and admire — so gracious. Only talk about sex, hah hah, just kidding. And about the diamond ring, the nice things is that a lot of Americans can have both the diamond and the art or furniture. Oh, one more thing, we do have a taboo subject in the USA and it make me so sad: Talking about your vacation, especially to any remotely exotic locale, is practically the only thing that is seen as bragging and vulgar in the US.
It is such a shame! When a colleague comes back from vacation hardly anyone asks or talks about it, unlike in France. I just want to say one last thing: Money is not a taboo subject in America because we have a lot of it. OMG this is so sad! But true in a lot of cities. I say, fuck all the judgment and perfection. And find your people! Maybe what they need is to watch a couple Fellini films in a moonlit park with an chamingly handsome Mediterranean man while sipping a few glasses of champagne and eating strawberries and macarrons.
I say we have earned the right to be as quirky and as unique as we wish to be and to have a lot fun doing it. First of all, overall there are like 4 guys for every girl — and a huge number of them might have great jobs ie, working for a startup that may make millions but this does not make them perfect guys. We are not dealing with typical guys — not even close to NY-typical guys.
These guys are oblivious to women and have pretty limited social skills. Recently I walked into a great coffee place with a friend on a Friday evening and there were about 30 guys in there not gay and about 8 women and none of the men were talking with the women except 2 who were there with dates or even looking at the women — all of the guys were talking with one another about work, some crazy techy thing, possibly gaming, bicycling, hiking, or Burning Man.
Have you seen the Big Bang Theory? So here in SV, when you take all of the geeks out of the mix, it leaves about 1 non-geek guy which here is the definition of a perfect man for every 40 women. So there is no magic formula here! I WISH for a check list where if I just went through — body, home, job, friends, etc, that would put you on the map.
Des bises et de la coolitude! I live in Dc so different dynamic, but not by much less models, LOL. OMG, G… you nailed it! On so many levels, you just nailed it right on the head. So thank goodness for laughter and for level heads! Super like cet article! New yorkais ou parisien!!! Your observation of NYC life is so, so spot-on! I was laughing out loud most of time. This is really messed up. And it just reminds me again why I adore London and would never want to live in New York. And the asterisk with the piece of text at the bottom could again be a hyperlink taking you back to the respective part in the main article.
Tech-savvy people here, anyone? I am Ukrainian by birth, but I was raised and live in London. For us quite a lot of my friends either come from similar background or at least spend way too much time with those who do it is something in-between french and american… You may see a couple of people at the same time mostly with no sex, but it does wary from person to person , but that ultimately means that you are not particularly interested. When you meet someone- you just know. And yes, of course it might not work out. You just move on without too much of a fuss.
And if you kern that a guy is seeing other girls, well it means that he is just not that interested. It is fair enough. To those amazing American girls: I have spent a fair amount of time in NY and have quite a few guy friends there; trust me if you stop trying so hard and stop letting guys waste your time- they will come running. Long lean muscular legs are great, but when they are attached to a doormat- never sexy.
I feel very passionately about this subject. A couple years ago I had an epiphany. It hit me during a time when I was working my ass off to get through grad school and work a full time job. I wanted to move beyond the exterior to appreciate who I had become. I realized more than ever that life is not static, and that all the things that seem imperfect are actually beautiful, and that great things do come from enjoying the process and letting go.
I realized that real wealth lies in our perspective, how we treat people, and the gratitude we feel for what we have- as is. Shades of this attitude have always been a part of who I am, evidenced in how I dressed in high school, when I moved to Berkeley after college and stopped shaving my legs, getting married in Vegas with only my husband, letting my gray hair grow in even though I am equally confident and self-conscious about it. When you do the math, all the mental energy and control it takes to present perfectly is time taken away from appreciating how fun and adventurous and liberating fully experiencing life can be.
Because a down-to-earth, stylish, confident, imperfect woman is WAY more interesting.
I LOVE this post. But yes, this post is so completely spot on. I also love the dating aspect of this post. I lived the past 5 years in London before moving here, and though the British and French may differ in a lot of ways, my experiences with dating were much more like the French way you described here than the American way.
When I first started dating my boyfriend we hit it off so incredibly well that I assumed we were boyfriend and girlfriend after I spent the first full weekend at his place a week and a half after we met. It seemed even more obvious when we had lunch with his mom. I thought I was your girlfriend two months ago! We were playing by different rules I guess. As man I have to say you hit the nail on the head. Love the blog and please keep writing darling. You are boyfriend and girlfriend. Of course there are exceptions, but this is the rule, I would say. My husband is from New York we met 3 years ago on flight london-lisbon — a total chance of fate but our relationship went the European way: The imperfections in life are what make us distinctive and artfully memorable, if we so let ourselves.
Im Perfect may come… and go. Trust me, I speak from experience. At the end of the day, we are who we are to those whom we care, and care about us. Im Perfect who had come and gone…. Please reach out if you are ever in San Francisco. I live in Los Angeles where at least that whole game is more transparent and silly.
Unfortunately really gifted and wonderful people waste quite a bit of energy and time exhausting themselves in this area. Where does excellence come in? Being passionate about something and going for it? Girls only gained access to the philosophy class in ; before this they were taught the same basic morality as the lower classes in the primary schools Poucet, p. Quoted in Gerbod, pp. Derrida points this out in QP, p. I return to this in the next chapter. Douailler and Vermeren, pp.
On the university in particular, see Digeon, pp. Hostility to German philosophy remained an important force, however. The designation was first employed by Albert Thibaudet in , in his book of the same name. On this mass programme of inculcation of a sense of nationality and of citizenship, see E. The bac became single-track again in Tavoillot, p. A terminale class in elementary mathematics was created in , but it also included philosophy.
On the history of rhetoric in schools, see Genette. I return to this essay in Chapter 3. On the universities, see Weisz and also Prost, , not in Bib. However, compared with academic philosophy in Germany at the same time, this freedom was still relatively Orchard. There, academic philosophers were not constrained even by the list of topics set out in a state programme: Anatole de Monzie, reprinted in Grateloup, p.
The instructions are also reprinted in F. Grateloup reproduces the instructions as the correct encapsulation of the mission and role of the prof de philo: However, it does not capture the full complexity of the most significant aspects of the situation of philosophy in relation to its history, cultural specificity, or politics. In other words, their work only ever expresses a particular position.
The initial impetus was thus very much a dispute internal to the profession of philosophy teaching. The framework which it set out comprised a twofold programme of research to be undertaken by a series of work groups. The focus of this analysis would be the conditions of teaching philosophy in France — in other words, the practical field and operative condition of GREPH itself.
The AP therefore asked: However, it was drafted by Derrida. They aimed to function in a deliberately informal, decentralized fashion, through a proliferation of work-groups operating in Paris and elsewhere. The list of the work groups printed in QP provides an overview of the kinds of subject-matter which GREPH members saw as embodying this kind of transformative critique, or at least furnishing the materials for it.
This list of about twenty work-groups deliberately states that it is not complete since there may be others of which they are not aware p. Despite this strong ENS presence, the projects listed focus mainly on the various constituent aspects of the material conditions of philosophy teaching within schools. Higher education as a specific institutional location for philosophy is not considered. This reference again suggests the theoretical preferences of the core group of members who subsequently put together QP. In each case, he argues, there followed a counter-reaction by the mechanisms of power.
The relationship of philosophy to other disciplines appears in terms of both literature teaching and the social sciences. Finally, cultural representations of the philosophy teacher are mentioned, though in a non-interpretive way — solely in terms of an examination of the condition of current philosophy teachers as depicted in these representations. Out of this came the journal, Le Doctrinal de Sapience,14 which linked GREPH to a chain of other groups working in the space of philosophy and history.
Like GREPH, the Doctrinal group took as its focus the opening up of a collective space for ref lection on the material conditions of teaching philosophy. The two groups shared a common approach and interests. The topics covered in the journal are the same as those focusing on la philosophie scolaire listed by the GREPH work-groups, and contributions overlapped. Both groups grew out of the sense of dissatisfaction felt by younger philosophy teachers confronted with what they saw as a period of retrenchment and increasing reaction following the events of However, the shared object of concern of both GREPH and Le Doctrinal members was specifically philosophy and its place within the educational system, rather than the educational system as a whole.
The system was struggling with the perceived need for enhanced scientific training, and with the effects of mass expansion: The resultant inability of higher education to cope with its accelerating population was one of the main triggers of the beginnings of student discontent in The main change, which was instituted in order to achieve the aims of modernization and democratization, was to establish a common curriculum for all pupils up to the age of fourteen.
These groups of teachers were not swayed, however, fearing that the system of ranks could only ultimately be dismantled by such integrationist policies. Beullac was instructed not to impose the reforms too rigidly for fear of provoking further opposition from these lobbies in the build-up to the election.
Meanwhile many schools had simply refused to make any attempt to implement the changes, and streaming of all kinds had continued unchecked. The degree of centralized control was still immense, and was maintained as a matter of principle: Instead, the mantras adopted to justify such unpopular modifications were of the need for education to adapt to the requirements of a modern society, and thus they laid stress on the importance of vocational training, attempting to increase its prestige and popularity.
Their concern with it as a whole translated into attention to its rhetoric of modernization. The role of humanities subjects within the non- humanities versions of the bac was being dramatically downgraded. The key role and status which both history and philosophy had acquired from their Third Republic incarnations was publicly being withdrawn in ways which they could no longer ignore. To understand this reaction, and the fierce opposition to philosophy becoming part of a programme of choice rather than compulsion, it is necessary to return to the Fouchet reforms of In the school sector, Fouchet dismantled the system which had enabled students to study any bac variant and then enrol on any degree course.
Pupils were no longer to be allowed to take a humanities bac and then a science degree. The bac was divided into five sections, each of which led to a particular faculty. The role of the humanities was hugely diminished as part of a general education. In other words, his reforms represented the first tacit admission of the need for prior specialization of a limited kind, and for a far greater emphasis on science education. The removal of its name was most of all a symbolic defeat: The children of cadres were now pushed into science subjects, and philosophy was placed permanently on the defensive.
The official representatives of philosophy did not feel the need to discuss the significance of the protests for the education system and their place within it. Philosophy was now threatened with becoming not just one discipline amongst others, but one option amongst others, and mass exposure to it would therefore be lost. It would sink without trace as an esoteric option, taken within humanities only by those thinking of pursuing it at university. Their pupils would thus be restricted to a self-selecting minority of apprentice philosophy-teachers.
Their fate would be that of Classics, which had lost its compulsory place in the premier cycle in the Fouchet reforms after a struggle by its upholders, who finally gave in to the idea of teaching only willing pupils. The battle-lines were thus drawn: This caused a fundamental tension within their project which they turned into a deliberate, overt strategy. This was to be examined as an ideological discourse and analysed alongside that of the government. They demanded that it be taught progressively, like other subjects, and not just in a single block at the very end of school QP, p.
This, they argued would transform not just the position and status of philosophy as a discipline, but its contents and modes of teaching. Defence and attack The defence of philosophy occasioned by the Haby reform was always couched in terms of a defence and never a justification. Despite what may appear as the ludicrous, self-defeatingly Orchard.
Both sides saw the debate in terms of a battle for philosophy itself, and for certain social outcomes, rather than simply a matter of pedagogical disagreements. Their single clear point of agreement in terms of the defence of philosophy was that philosophy must remain compulsory. Philosophy was, and still is, on this level a part of mass education; this is not deluded self-f lattery on the part of its practitioners. As secondary education expanded, so the numbers involved, both teachers and pupils, increased hugely as the figures mentioned so far illustrate. Historical accounts of its demise there have argued that its very compulsory nature was what made it uniquely vulnerable, rather then the reverse.
Moreover, the narrative rehearsed by those in charge of philosophy within education eliminated as a reference point: They thus tried to divorce the term of general culture from its past ideological determinations as an elite strand of a very particular kind of education, merely trading on it as a vague allusion. This highly symbolic kind of defence — philosophy as the touchstone of a particular kind of culture — was produced repeatedly and unapologetically.
These would effectively replace the now outmoded humanities, and philosophy in particular, in a techno-democratic society. Duverger makes no reference to this earlier criticism of the deleterious effects of philosophy within schools. His attack is couched in terms of the new demands of a modern, technologically oriented society, but the opposition between social sciences and philosophy as moderns and conservatives is unchanged, and the institutional and intellectual battle between philosophy and sociology which commenced with Durkheim is clearly still at issue here.
Zeldin does not acknowledge its antecedents, however, nor its connotations within the institutionalization of philosophy. They could only be: Both GREPH and the conservatives characterize the social sciences in this way, either overtly or by default. The philosopher, Jean Lacroix, argued in Le Monde that: On the one hand, the social sciences were associated with processes of modernization and with American intervention in France in the s and s.
As such, they were viewed as ideologically tainted, as well as Orchard. The form taken by this American project of fostering social science research was indeed, in some cases, a Cold War project, aiming to fend off the encroachments of Marxism. This reaction to Duverger and to Haby ref lected not just disciplinary rivalry. The view that philosophy came naturally at the end of education, not as crown or synthesis as in the nineteenth century but as critique, entailed sovereignty over the other disciplines.
This produced a tension in their work, making it difficult for them not to keep philosophy in sovereign position in relation to other forms of knowledge, as will be seen in due course. Ten years earlier, at the time of the Fouchet reforms, the official upholders had been mainly concerned to define philosophy as a non-literary subject. The only convergence was the apprenticeship of language. Philosophy was still in sovereign position here, as crown of literature, coming after and teaching another language — that of rational debate and of thought. One is that science is rarely discussed and neither is literature.
He mentions the history of science and maths, but again, his real target is the social sciences. For the radicals, aiming to further the Orchard. All the more so since the work of Derrida in this period is strongly associated with the social science disciplines of linguistics, anthropology and psychoanalysis which were within the purview of structuralism. The presence of a certain kind of psychology as part of the legacy of Cousin within academic philosophy had long been decried. The rivalry was thus both intellectual and institutional for these were the disciplines with the closest ties to academic philosophy.
The former displays the inf luence of the latter. For GREPH and its allies, philosophy was to become a place of subversion, and had already become so in the s.
Le Choix du conjoint : Une enquête psycho-sociologique en France (Hors Collection) (French Edition)
Philosophy is vulnerable to such attacks, he argued, because of its unique vocation: As such it haunts the nightmares of millionaires and captains of industry alike because of its anarchic power and boundless force. Their portrait of the philosophical radicals, including GREPH, and particularly Derrida, is uniformly hostile, both at the time and in retrospect.
Even in their capacity of philosophers participant in subsequent processes of ref lection and reform of philosophy in education, they display no interest in the nuances and contradictions of the s debate. This defence of philosophy as the possibility of contestation was to become an institutional argument: Derrida turns round the argument of the covert philosophy of other disciplines, making it into an argument for philosophy throughout schooling. However, philosophy is still unapologetically placed in sovereign position over the pre-critical philosophies contained within other forms of teaching.
There is no sense of ideology in his account. The difficult relations between philosophy and other disciplines, and hence the possibilities of radically reconcept ualizing philosophy itself, are very problematic for GREPH throughout their work. The need to argue simultaneously for philosophy whilst rethinking it as a discipline runs the risk either of dissolving it too effectively, or coming very close to the essentializing terms of philosophy as the saviour of their conservative opponents.
Derrida both includes it as part of the necessary transformation of philosophy, and registers caution about it at the same time. Thus the report of the strike committee of the Law Faculty had denounced current disciplinary divisions as part of the capitalist organization of society, and, in particular, the division of the sciences humaines as technicist and ideological. She gives the example of the depressing realisation that the work of Alain, mythologized as a philosophy teacher but not as a philosopher, was now treated as worthy of philosophical respect at least officially, whereas ten years earlier it had been derided as a bad joke.
This would only be recuperated. His attack is thus in the same line as that of Paul Nizan in against what he termed Les Chiens de garde, but is less polemical and more pessimistic. The way philosophy is taught in schools determines its existence in universities, eliminating the possibility of renewal in either.
New forms of knowledge are entered in to the Programme as a paragraph in the introduction or as an addendum p. These manuals act as a contradiction of the philosophy teachers claims to intellectual freedom and the engagement in untrammelled philosophical ref lection with their class, and they show up school philosophy for the reductive routine way in which it in fact operates. He does affirm, in the midst of his excoriation of philosophy, that if there is no good philosophy, there is no good suppression of philosophy either p. But his account leaves little manoeuvring room for the creation of alternative modes of pedagogical practice.
The upholders of the status quo recycled these defences even as they tried to find new adaptations of them more in keeping with the mantras of modernization and democratization. This led to a series of contradictory claims made on behalf of philosophy in its current form in French education. This was more than a matter of trading on an image alone. This was at best a temporary reprieve rather than an outright victory, however. This question was used to dismiss the group in retrospect as simply the expression of a position — radical, avant-garde, renowned — within a particular circumscribed field of possibilities.
This cast aside the political and intellectual content of their work, in terms of its substantive engagement with both education and philosophy. In order to both defend and attack, they set themselves the task of a complex mode of self-situation, analysing the discourses which circulated in order to dismantle them and then to effect a transformative critique.
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This aim was stated at the beginning of QP as part of their avowedly anti-corporatist positioning: This was their more generalizing intent, not simply to focus on philosophy in isolation, but to put into question the implications of the current divisions and teaching of different subjects in relation to one another. This analysis was conceived of as both epistemological and political. Their desire to address the actual reform as a whole was not borne out during the press campaign, although their attacks on technocracy testify vividly to the embattled situation of the humanities.
Within their perspective the democratizing intentions of the reform were obfuscatory rhetoric, aiming only to create more and better skilled workers, and thus to service the capitalist state. But to assess the aims of the reform overall would have required Orchard. As a series of contestatory practices aimed at intellectual and institutional trans- formation, and at reasserting the impossibility of separating the two, the provenance is clear therefore.
He traces a similar predicament in the defence of humanities subjects in the English context. When trying to engage with the attacks on the humanities within British universities, they found that: Young suggests that this situation is indicative of what he terms the limitations of oppositional politics, since in attacking humanism, the radicals found that they were placing themselves effectively in consort with Government policy. Young is right to identify the uneasy position of educational radicals, particularly those whose concerns are disciplinary — that is to say, attacking and questioning the prevailing values and ideology of the institutionalization of their discipline, as well as its methods of teaching and assessment.
The position of those debating at the level of the system as a whole is to some extent more straightforward since they do not have to wage internal battle with their most immediate colleagues simultaneously. Effectively, on this view, educational radicals are left with no position from which to argue.
GREPH was similarly engaged in this kind of politics of the humanities, but the terms of their debate were changed by their focus on schools rather than universities. Philosophy as the locus of critique was, crucially, a function of its place in mass, compulsory education. Also, GREPH was more concerned to differentiate their defence from previous and contemporary positions than their attack. The pre-existing discourse of the defence of philosophy in schools, which was more or less coeval with the institutional arrangement itself, provided them with one of their most significant strands of discursive analysis.
The implication is that the institutionalization of philosophy can only ever be a debasement of philosophy itself, an untrue version, through the sheer force of pedagogical routinization and institutional recuperation. Philosophy is therefore allowed immense potential power, but is always necessarily vanquished by the organization of its practice: Notes to Chapter 2 1.
I am not here attempting to cover this ground again. See Atack; Cockburn and Blackburn, eds. Ferry and Renaut, eds. As will be explained below, Douailler and Vermeren another co-editor are both former members of Le Doctrinal de Sapience; they produced this collection as the result of a seminar and work-group at the CIPh.
I will examine this double approach in the next chapter. In there were 1, philosophy teachers in schools, an increase from five years previously when there were 1, University philosophy teachers in comparison were small in number: In the same period the number of university teachers in Lettres as a whole went from 1, at the start of the s to 5, in , more than twice Orchard. Its analyses will be discussed in Chapter 4. The topic of women in the history of philosophy and its teaching is also listed — a rare gesture towards feminism in the political and philosophical project of GREPH.
I will return to this in Chapter 5 in the context of the founding of the CIPh a decade later. It is at that point that the temptation to style such operations as, simply, anti-institutions is more fully broached, and particular vigilance with regard to this is brought into play. This essay is examined in detail in Chapter 3. A testimony to the teacher depicted in this novel, i. George himself, appeared in Le Doctrinal de Sapience see Petit, p. The latter two will be discussed again in Chapter 4, in relation to the myth of the prof de philo arising from the period of the Third Republic.
Thompson in this context, see Rif kin and Thomas, eds. GREPH acknowledged that it had to restrict its focus to the system in which it operated since its aim was both theoretical and practical from the start. For a PCF declaration of support for philosophy, see Besse. These figures are taken from A. This long and drawn-out process of consultation represented a procedural departure for the ministry and was a very public attempt at forging consensus prior to determining action.
Accounts of the reforms can also be found in Halls; H. These figures are taken from Halls, p. The formulation of Ardagh, p. Both cited in ibid. Raynaud and Thibaud, p. On the Republican educational values, see Corbett, Coq was himself a teacher and a frequent commentator on both educational and philosophical issues at the time for Esprit and other more specialist publications.
I will look at these below. Haby insists throughout the interview that his hostility to pedagogical innovation is not part of his modernization. I refer to this edition throughout because of its greater accessibility than the original articles. For accounts of the Fouchet reforms and the complex changes made in the university structure, see Halls, pp. Poucet more or less omits the Haby reforms since the archives which form the major source of his study are as yet unavailable to scholars.
Marchal, and Poucet, pp. He does not specify that this is only in fact true of France, nor that the campaign for its survival over the preceding decade had been headed by Derrida, his designated arch-enemy and — according to him — chief destroyer of liberal education and hence philosophy p. Debates about the constant reforms leading to particular modifications of curriculum or of classroom hours ref lect this degree of both politicization and fundamental questioning.
When those in charge of the educational system still viewed it as educationally fundamental, it was taught to a minority: As its educational role shrank to one of distinction and prestige within the non-science subjects only, and not within education as a whole, so the numbers exposed to it increased as a result of the changing nature of the system — from 30, in , to , in , including the bac technique.
Cited in Brunet, p. This is the argument of G. Davie, the historian of Scottish universities, who argues from the perspective of the advantages of reintroducing and expanding philosophy: In Germany it was not compulsory in the same way: For an example of the defence of classics in the English context at the beginning of this cycle of massification of education, and the decline of the humanities as self-evidently the natural training-ground for an elite, cf. Plumb ed , Finlay insists that no subject can be maintained by compulsion. Lee Too and N. Livingstone eds , Classics has arguably functioned in analogous ways in English education to philosophy in France.
For an excellent history of classics within English education, cf. This will be examined fully in Chapter 4. The APPEP, founded in , viewed the Fouchet and Haby reforms as its period of glory and struggle, irrespective of the outcomes ibid. It is merely indicative of the intransigence and — admittedly understandable — protectionism of the Association that he claimed that the battle never changed: For an example of a recent defence of philosophy as a compulsory part of mass education, see P. Ringer, Fields of Knowledge, pp. The latter camp was very much inf luenced by Durkheim; the former represented the humanities, including classics and philosophy.
On philosophy in particular see Fabiani. Emmanuel, writing in Le Figaro on 18 February Emmanuel had some experience of educational controversy and curricular reform, having served on a commission for the reform of French literature teaching four years earlier. I use both terms — human and social sciences — but of course do not wish to suggest an equation between what is understood in English by social science and in French by sciences humaines.
The institutional and intellectual history of the two is significantly different. I therefore use the English phrase to refer to the terrain of the French sciences humaines simply as a convenience. Brooks provides an in-depth account of this emergence. Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, p. Bernadi, Fussler, Henry, and Lhomme. Dreyfus and Khodoss, pp. Although they do not refer to this essay, Jean-Luc Nancy, together with a literature teacher, Bernadette Gromer, tackled exactly this schema of the relationship between literature and philosophy teaching, and the relationship of both to language in their teaching, as part of the experiments in teaching younger pupils philosophy which they carried out for GREPH.
I will examine their account in detail in Chapter 4. Their sub- Nietzschean rhetoric is of the courage of the one who dares to unmask and the posture of the heroic philosopher. Echoes of this kind are to be found in the contribution of Martine Meskel and Michael Ryan to QP which invokes Nietzsche explicitly within a rhetoric of risk. GREPH alone dares to criticize philosophy teaching and is cast as the unhypocritical criminal in relation to the hypocritical judges QP, p.
Declaration of philosophy teachers of Saint-Malo, October , cited in Robert, p. They are also reprinted in DP. As part of the seminar at the ENS in which Derrida introduced the subject of the history of the teaching of philosophy, he also brought in a corpus of Marxist texts to his teaching for the first time — Marx and Engels, Gramsci, Althusser, Balibar Derrida, Points de suspension, pp.
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Lyotard, La Condition postmoderne. As author of this report, Lyotard, p. Lyotard viewed it with suspicion as already subsumed under a jargon of bureaucratic accountability and managerialism. Nizan and Sartre both criticized academic philosophy as the purveyor of a meaningless bourgeois humanism, one which included the study of Marx only in order to refute his arguments as part of a set routine. For Nizan, philosophy needed to be made more concrete and specific, and to change its teaching was an urgent task.
In , Althusser had come to broadly optimistic conclusions: As such, it bore greater similarities to J. Also, Dutourd who commented: I return to this assembly in Chapter 4. Derrida and Bennington, p. Young, Torn Halves, pp. This interview with D. The nature of these demands forms the focus of Chapter 4. However, Derrida was not simply the best-known and relatively older member of the group. He served as a figurehead, spoke on its behalf, and wrote its founding documents in consultation with others. Other main contributions to QP will be examined in detail in Chapter 4, notably those of Jean-Luc Nancy and of Roland Brunet, as well as the multiform nature of the collection.
Derrida, as interviewee, is not about to produce a summary of links since this would not capture these relations in ways which the texts themselves do not already do. One of the reasons which he gives for not writing on these questions before now is that his thinking simply coincided with these critiques of the educational system p. He does not feel the need to parade this allegiance, nor to publish a record of his minor disagreements in the manner of a former disciple. He thus introduced questions of the institution and of politics and philosophy into his teaching. The double strategy of simultaneous defence and attack, and of theoretical and practical interventions which the AP had outlined, pertained no less to his teaching practice.
The aim was both theoretical and practical and the method both philosophical and historical. The dual methodology comprised both bringing to light the history of philosophy as an institution, and the history of the concrete situation in which they were functioning — in other words, philosophy teaching in France, as well as theoretical ref lection upon that history. This kind of research and analysis enabled them to intervene politically.
The study and consideration of disciplinarity is part of a project of critique AP, p. This is posed as a clustering of questions in AP, which is worth quoting in full since the entwined interrelations of these questions gives an initial indication of the difficulty of unravelling the problematic: But this is a more complex issue to resolve than in other areas, such as literature.
Behind this enquiry is the guiding self-idealization of philosophy as an educational practice: The crucial correlation of this is that if philosophy is not taught, in some way it does not take place. The practice of philosophy, on this view, is its teaching, in dialogue, in the form of questioning between teacher and pupil — in other words, the originary scene of Socrates and the pupil-disciple. As such, it is a special case precisely because it is the most representative case of teaching and learning in general. Philosophy as incarnated by Socrates is first and foremost an activity, and that activity is its teaching.
Teaching is the most representative form of philosophizing and the most authentic incarnation of active ref lection. It is meant to correct the myopia of the past and the imme- diate. The essential reference point is Plato, and philosophy envisaged as the Socratic dialogue, conducted together by teacher and pupil, rather than indoctrination beaten into the bored schoolchild by an empowered, authoritarian pedagogue.
This is the paradox of Socrate-fonctionnaire in both senses — the banalized routine of the institution, the contradiction of philosophy in the service of the state. If philosophy is most truly embodied in its teaching, then pedagogy, implying pre- set methods and inert curricula transmitted uniformly and routinely, functions as its implicit antithesis. This, in turn, forms an additional strand: Bourdieu is referring to the modern pursuit of academic philosophy.
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The institutional determinations of philosophy are seen as crucial in both their approaches. As such, his work is part of the intellectual background to any critical consideration of education at the time, and in particular of the specific problems of the French system. Bourdieu, like GREPH, is concerned to re-emphasize the importance of the material conditions and practice of philosophy as a discipline. Bourdieu construes the relationship between philosophy and sociology — an unusually close one in intellectual and institutional terms in France21 — as one of conf lict: The question of where they stand in relation to other disciplines is therefore a crucial and difficult one.
Bourdieu takes his cue from Durkheim for this attack on philosophy through its dominant pedagogical modes. As mentioned already in Chapter 2, above, Durkheim was critical of philosophy teaching in France because of what he considered to be the tangibly noxious effects of its teaching. Bourdieu is not, of course, simply producing another defence of the positive methods of sociology.
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Rather, he defends the primacy of sociology in terms of its alternative philosophy — in other words, in terms of its superior theoretical legitimacy which derives from its realization of the constitutive role of the social and historical conditions of thought. Pedagogically, the text is then actualized by the philosophy teacher each time he uses it in his class. If the history of philosophy, according Orchard. In other words, the external history of philosophy is deemed to be not philosophical by philosophers, and to have only secondary, empirical status alongside their own discourse, which cannot be seen to be determined by it: The danger and reductiveness of this approach is that it results in only ever discovering the same, single meaning in each philosophical text and in every philosophical practice: As Derrida formulates it: The philosophical tradition exceeds the restriction of a contest between philosophy and sociology.
As one Bourdieu commentator has remarked, there is an important sense in which Bourdieu asks the right questions, irrespective of the answers he then provides. Both he and Pinto were originally philosophy teachers. Pinto analyses the field in terms of two poles: The collective aspect of GREPH, including university and school philosophy teachers, does not fit this schema, and so is dismissed as mere face-saving rhetoric.
He ignores this, since it does not fit his pattern. Their work therefore remains resolutely non-philosophical, external, and antagonistic to philosophy and in sharp contradistinction to that of GREPH. These two practices of philosophy teaching do provide a significant contrast, but one which is less straightforward than that kind of characterization would suggest.
Analytic philosophers, as opposed to historians of ideas or of philosophy, nonetheless rely on a canon of historical texts, which are taught in Orchard. When GREPH was operating, the philosophy teacher still relied on a textual approach, a more literary explication de texte model than the analytic philosopher, but the history of philosophy nonetheless consisted of the doxographical recital of a series of opinions and arguments of past philosophers without reference to their historical status or context.
The predominance of history of philosophy much criticized in French philosophy teaching equates to the criticism that it is too reliant on models of literary criticism rather than rational argument. Their teaching was not, therefore, based on philological commentary; this was a gradual and later shift, which Bourdieu simplistically claims represents the sole form of teaching philosophy in France over the last two centuries.
As mentioned already, they produced a presentation of GREPH and Le Doctrinal de Sapience in , noting its relevance to their project, and they are in turn mentioned in QP as a related project-group. The statement emphasizes that instead, Orchard. Within its own, specific context, however, this was very much part of the project sketched out in the AP, in the inventories drawn up of elements of the conditions of teaching philosophy, both past and present.
But these were not conceived of as elements of an external history of philosophy, but as themselves constitutive and hence, potentially at least, instruments of philosophical and critical transformation. GREPH adopted the brief statement made by Georges Canguilhem in response to the questionnaire on the Haby reform sent out by Nouvelle Critique and published in May as an encapsulation of their project. To defend the latter, yet attack its present form, required the excavation of the historical and ideological underpinnings of the status quo in philosophy teaching.
The manner of their inscription within particular texts and pedagogical practices is raised, though the examples given are less specifically French ones. Some of it came to fruition in the initial work in Qui a peur de la philosophie? There is no avoiding the question in as much as it is itself both philosophical and philosophically controversial. The charge that philosophy could not and should not exist within the state educational system was made in the nineteenth century by both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In terms of elaborating his strategy, it only suggests a kind of personal level of difficulty: If Derrida were simply putting forward such a disagreement and at the same time producing work which they in turn would not accept, then there would be no contradiction: This misleadingly suggests an oppositional activity that is confrontational in a simple, direct way.
As Geoff Bennington states: In trying to separate itself off in this way it maintains only a useless parallelism in which it never engages with that discourse, but merely runs alongside, and is ultimately re-assimilated at a later stage institutionally: As he emphatically comments: As such a relation to the institution necessarily implies a prise de parti within this field. However, Derrida is not simply operating some sort of demystification here, whereby an apparently neutral, benign set-up is at a stroke unveiled as politicized and political through and through.
He invokes the particularly over-determined position of speaking from within, and, in a non-straightforward sense, against, philosophy. It is only in taking on the frame at the same time that transformation is possible which goes beyond internal critique. He elaborates the point thus: In this sense, the operation is a belated one, since as he notes he has been functioning within the system for fifteen years. The danger of invoking the teaching body in this way is that it again implies a unity, that of a single body marshalling its resources on behalf of philosophy in general, against the agression of the non-philosophical construed as an external threat p.
But there is also internal con- f lict and opposition within p. By decomposing the structures of the institution, disaggregating them, de-naturalizing them, the deconstructive strategy is a double one, of transformation and reinscription, going beyond the necessary stage of critique. Those who remain unsuspicious of the institution, he adds, are perhaps the most vigorous agents of its decomposition. The movement of re-inscription thus aims to go beyond a simple inversion or reversal.
The question of the institution is not just a neglected area, to be brought back to the fore in the first instance and then, once passed through definitively as a stage, transcended. Thus, on the one hand, the inf lexible centralization of the French educational system is invoked in terms of a military operation p. Just as Derrida is seeking to avoid the recourse to sociological reduction referred to above, he is indicating another function of his double gesture. It is a curious one, corresponding to that of a teacher who produces nothing, that is to say who neither innovates nor transforms.
In a further twist, he becomes also the representative of that system or, rather, an expert in its demand. Having first submitted to its demands himself, he in turn explains it, translates it, repeating and re-presenting it on behalf of his young pupils. In so doing, he thus acquires this role of expert in the interpretation of that demand. Importantly, this leads to a kind of dissociation, or indeed to a series of dissociations. The teacher is in the position of applying rules to which he does not himself subscribe, which he is engaged in criticizing elsewhere.
This corollary of the position of the aspirant as explained here is particularly linked to a cycle of teaching geared to the production of apprentice philosophy teachers, in which the cycle of systemic reproduction is unbroken. Derrida thus falls into an assumption of reproduction of the teaching body which is more relevant to philosophy teaching in universities than in schools in France, although he does not make this clear.
This function was carried out by someone not yet a teacher, who had just finished being a student, and was thus only slightly older than them. Thus none of the connotations of the master and his disciples are present. There is no model of authority and no transferential relationships. In short, it is the antithesis of the idealized scene of teaching in what Orchard. This figure is here instantiated by Condillac p. Derrida does not want to be simply caught by an opposition between, on the one hand, a scene of philosophy teaching understood as belonging to a former golden age or merely functioning as an exhortatory ideal to which current practice should aspire, and its counterpart, on the other, philosophy teaching in a decadent, fallen state, necessarily contaminated by the institution.
This is the opposition between philosophy and pedagogy. From this stems the counter reference point: The implicit or explicit claim that philosophy is indissociably linked to teaching, but as anti-pedagogy, has been made in the French discourse on philosophy teaching, but also outside it. Gregory Ulmer and Vincent B.
Pedagogy is opposed to untrammelled philosophical activity, and is deemed to be ineradicably inauthentic: The problem of the immanent untruth of pedagogy lies probably in the fact that the pursuit is tailored to its recipients, that it is not purely objective work for the sake of the subject matter itself.
Rather, the thematics of repetition are generalized. This structural possibility is twofold: There is a gap in the system for those in the middle ranks, like Derrida, neither insecure nor already fully invested in the system p. This subversion occurs as the series of dissociations already mentioned OC, p.
There is a splitting in relation to an ascribed educational role. But this is not just a kind of professional malaise of the type diagnosed by Jean-Louis Fabiani as the only thing to be learnt from attacks on philosophy teaching by philosophy teachers. This mediation makes him emblematic of the functioning of the system as a whole. The critique, in other words, of the routinization force of pedagogy. Derrida employs a linguistic homology. There is no awareness of education, and its reform, as historical; it is treated as atemporal and neutral.
This historicity derives from the relative autonomy of teaching from knowledge. Genette evokes the classe de rhetorique, Orchard. This official death of rhetoric — in formal education — has of course had a complex afterlife, as suggested by the very varied re-appropriations of its classificatory system of figures as a renewable taxonomy by Genette himself.
Genette makes the point thus: For Genette, the very institutionality of teaching, which is not generally recognized, and hence its historicity, derives from the relative autonomy of teaching from knowledge. The discrepancy is between the structures of knowledge and of teaching --in other words, of practice Genette, p. However, care is needed here if we are to avoid sliding into a view of teaching as ancillary, and of no account in the tradition of a discipline, thought as internal to itself in its unfolding, the practices of education as external.
Derrida views the relationship between teaching and knowledge — in terms of philosophy — as more intimate than this. Yet he does not want to advocate an anti-pedagogy as saviour of philosophy against inevitable routinization. There is a fundamental heterogeneity between the institution and knowledge, which always exceeds it and cannot be articulated by it.
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He posits his linguistic homology at the level of structural invariance, and hence of necessity. This homology of the gap and the delay between the structure of teaching and knowledge, and the structure of language is concerned with a principle of effacement, in which constitutive mediations — of pedagogical practice, of the operations of language — are obscured almost as an article of faith.
If any force is to be allowed the linguistic analogy — crudely, that practice, like language, mediates, constitutes, and can therefore transform — it has to be this possibility of transformation, not just as deferred hope, but that both are themselves transformational operations, always already. The parallels with the teaching of rhetoric as part of the teaching of literature are illuminating, but only up to a point.
On the other, the teaching of literature is clearly not prey to the same kinds of structural anxiety as philosophy, since its practitioners are not seeking to elide their activity with that of writing literature. They have no stake in claiming creative status for what they do. Whatever large claims can be and are advanced on behalf of teaching literature, teaching a novel and writing a novel have never been seen as the same activity, even if Genette interestingly reminds us that the study of rhetoric was allied to the art of learning to write well rather than to learn objective facts about the history of literature, or learn how to produce readings, as in the subsequent incarnations of literature teaching.
The striking contrast drawn out and elaborated with such care is that of, on the one hand, the critique of educational forms and practices as dangerously reductive, in a dialectic of attempted subversion and inevitable recuperation in which everything remains the same. On the other hand, to try not to fall into this ever-waiting trap, Derrida stresses the importance of the frame, and of examining educational forms and norms which are taken for granted, even by those who have written the most condemnatory accounts of old-fashioned or ideologically unbearable curricula.
But it is the institution of philosophy which is important here, precisely because of its guiding self-idealization as in some way the most representative form of Orchard. The relationship between philosophy and the historical institution is understood in terms of a thematics of repetition in relation to teaching in general. Notes to Chapter 3 1. The interview was published in Digraphe in two parts: The only previous series of interviews Derrida had given before this was Positions in Listed in the groupes de travail section of QP, as already mentioned, and also in the introduction to OC this is reprinted in DP, from which I take the pagination.
Derrida explains there how he simply abandoned his thesis between and as his own philosophical trajectory changed. This formal mark of disapproval meant that Derrida never taught within the university as such. See the introduction to Grisoni, Politiques de la philosophie. Derrida includes within this apparatus that of publishing, as a support structure to the university, and an additional field of its operations, but his own analyses focus on the institution of education.
This was discussed in Chapter 1 above. Unlike Durkheim, whose critique of philosophy and of the classical humanities approach is used and adapted by Bourdieu, as will be discussed below. As noted above, Brooks provides a clear overview of the relations between academic philosophy and sociology in the late nineteenth century. Other useful historical surveys of the emergence of French sociology include T. Clark, Leroux, and Mucchielli. Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, p. This is not an imaginary target: Macherey, Histoires de dinosaur, p.
He takes the title phrase from the work of the Oxford linguistic philosopher J. Austin, whose work he approves of, using it provocatively of course, to import empirical connotations into the field which disdains empirical research. He does not concentrate on the differences between Analytic and Continental philosophy in terms of their practices, even though he is keen to acknowledge intellectual debts to both Austin and Wittgenstein Bourdieu, The English context of philosophy in which these two philosophers operated was analysed, and attacked, in a not unrelated way by Ernest Gellner.
In his book on Oxford linguistic philosophy and on Wittgenstein, Words and Things: A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology, Gellner launched a polemic on the concealed ideologies of social distinction of notably Austin. I return to the question of the philosophical tradition in relation to Derrida at the end of Chapter 5. A note of caution is necessary here: He does not analyse it in detail there, however. Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, edn, pp. Derrida very deliberately does not move into sociology. Macherey realised that the remarks, originally aimed at a Chinese audience, were in fact really addressed to a French audience.
See also Chaitin, p. Lamont, who at p. This is not a polemical usage, simply an index of her lack of understanding of their role and history within what purports to be a sociohistorical account. See, for example, Critchley, , p. For an approving account of why there is nothing wrong with such an approach, see Watson. Radical Philosophy, 15 , Editorial, p. Or, to take an example from the long defence of philosophy teaching against the Fouchet reforms and against literature teaching: For an example of this, see Lefranc, , p.
Cited in Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, eds. The question of the university and philosophy as elaborated by Derrida will be examined in Chapter 5. This essay will be discussed in Chapter 5. This battle-ground was taken up again in the s. See, for example, Besnier. First published in , and translated and reprinted in Critical Models: Louis Marin makes a similar point in his contribution to the collection on the university and political commitment edited by Alan Montefiore. This is precisely the opposition, between authenticity vouchsafed by the creative production of new knowledge, and transmission as the dead hand of institutional routinization only, which Derrida is seeking to disrupt.